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Abstract
Researchers and policy-makers accept that implementation decisively influences the
effectiveness of European (EU) environmental policy. Some Member States lead the
development of EU policy and implement Directives with little problem. Others follow a variety
of compliance (or non-compliance) paths. Implementation gaps and policy failures are
prevalent. Policy outcomes often differ radically between even neighbouring Member States.
What are the reasons for these differences? Why do Member States follow different compliance
paths? Why do implementation gaps and policy failures occur? What factors can explain the
different policy outcomes achieved? Is it only ‘classical’ implementation variables i.e. the
monitoring and enforcement actions of public authorities that count? What lessons can we draw
for the future? This paper addresses these questions through a comparative analysis of the
implementation of the European Directive on the reduction of air pollution from existing
municipal waste incineration plants (89/429/EEC) in Germany, the Netherlands, France and the
United Kingdom: four neighbouring Member States that exhibit quite divergent compliance
paths and policy outcomes. Monitoring and enforcement are found to have only limited
explanatory power. In practice national contextual variables, such as: public and political
environmental awareness; interactions both with environmental and non-environmental policies;
regulatory anticipation and uncertainty; the degree of autonomy and scope of regulatory
agencies; and, industrial and market structure of the regulated industry, must also be considered.
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1. Introduction
Even neighbouring Member States are often far from equally effective in implementing EU
environmental policy. The difficulty of successfully implementing EU policy is mirrored in
literature focussing on implementation deficits of EU environmental policy (see for example
Collins and Earnshaw, 1992; Jordan, 1999). There is a tendency to understand implementation
as depending exclusively on authorities' actions – particularly monitoring and enforcement. This
is reflected in the recent European Council resolution on the ‘drafting, implementation and
enforcement of Community environmental law’ (Glachant, 2000, citing the Official Journal
321/1 of 22.10.97). The same focus is found in the economics literature dealing with
implementation (for recent surveys see Cohen, 1998 and Heyes, 2000). But are monitoring and
enforcement really the central driving factors?
We investigate this question based on the diverse (non-)compliance paths Germany, the
Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom (UK) followed (outlined in section 2) 1 with
respect to the Council Directive on the reduction of air pollution from existing2 municipal
waste-incineration plants (89/429/EEC) (hereafter referred to as “the Directive” or “the EU
Directive”) which defined emission limits for various pollutants (cf. table 1), and upgrading
deadlines for various sizes of plant. Significantly no emissions limit for dioxins was specified.
As will become apparent, however, national responses to dioxin emissions have proved
particularly important with respect to the outcomes achieved.
In analysing the factors that have influenced the respective outcome this article adopts a broad
perspective. We describe the 'classical' implementation variables, i.e. permitting, monitoring and
enforcement activities, and ask to what extent they explain the policy outcomes obtained. We
investigate the influence of national contextual variables, such as: public and political
environmental awareness; interactions with environmental and non-environmental policies;
regulatory anticipation and uncertainty; the degree of autonomy and scope of regulatory
agencies; and, industrial and market structure of the regulated industry, on the implementation
process. The impact of national regulatory provisions and associated (abatement) technology
specific factors are also discussed. Some of these contextual factors influence the monitoring
                                                          
1 The article is based on case studies on the implementation of the Directive 89/429/EEC in the four
countries (Bültmann and Wätzold, 2000; Eames, 2000; Lulofs, 2000 and 2001; and Schucht, 2000) which
were prepared in the context of the project ‘The Implementation of EU Environmental policies:
Efficiency Issues’ funded by the European Commission (DG XII).
2 The Directive defines ‘existing’ plant as “…those for which the first authorisation to operate is granted
before 1 December 1990”.
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and enforcement whilst others do not. On the basis of this analysis relevant country-specific
variables are identified and general factors supporting or impeding effective implementation
deduced.
The article is structured as follows. Section two presents the emission standards imposed by the
Directive, briefly summarises the transposition of the Directive into national legislation and
presents the compliance paths of the four countries. In sections three to six the specific
implementation processes in the four countries are described, focusing on factors that explain
the respective compliance results. Section seven summarises the case study findings and
delivers conclusions.
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2. Three Distinct Compliance Paths
The case study countries demonstrate considerable differences in national legislative
requirements and compliance paths. Germany and the Netherlands were both environmental
‘leaders’ with strict pre-existing legislation on emissions from waste incinerators. Indeed, by the
time the EU Directive was adopted both countries were about to impose significantly stricter
and more far reaching domestic limits under respectively the: 1989 Dutch Incineration
Guideline (Richtlijn Verbranden); and, 1990 German Ordinance on the Incineration of Waste
(Verordnung über Verbrennungsanlagen für Abfälle – 17. BImSchV). These limits are
compared to the Directive limits in Table 1.
Table 1: EU, French, UK, Dutch and German emission limits in mg/m3 for existing incinerators
Pollutant EU and France
To be met by 1 Dec. 1996 by
incinerators > 6t/hr and by 1 Dec.
2000 by smaller
incinerators
EU and France
Transitional
arrangement from
1 Dec. 1995 to
1 Dec. 2000 for
incinerators < 6t/hr
UK
To be met by
1 Dec. 1996
NL
To be met by 1
Jan. 1995
Germany
To be met by 1
Dec. 1996
< 1 t/hr 1 t/hr- 3 t/hr > 3 t/hr <1t/hr 1-6t/hr > 1 t/hr All capacities All capacities
Dust 200 100 30 600 100 30 5 10
Pb+Cr+Cu+Mn - 5 5 - - 1
(including
As+Ni+Sn)
1
(including
Ni+As+Sb+V+Sn
+Co+Se+Te)
0.5
(including
Sb+As+Co
+Ni+V+Sn)
Ni+As - 1 1 - -
Cd+Hg - 0.2 0.2 - - 0.1 (Cd)
0.1 (Hg)
0.05 (Cd)
0.05 (Hg)
0.05 (Cd+TI)
0.05 (Hg)
HCl 250 100 50 - - 30 10 10
HF ‘divided’ 4 2 - - 2 1 1
SO2 - 300 300 - - 300 40 50
(SO2 + SO3)
CO 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 50
Organic
compounds
20 20 20 - - 20 10 10
NO2 - - - - - 350 70 200
Dioxins and
furans
- - - - - 1 ng/nm3 0.1 ng/nm3 0.1 ng/nm3
Emission limits in mg/m3 for existing incinerators. Standard conditions: 273 degrees K, 101,3 kPa, 11% Oxygen or 9% CO2
France and the UK represent two countries with poor pre-existing regulatory standards for the
control of municipal waste incineration. France transposed the Directive by the ministerial order
of 25 January 1991 (arrêté du 25 janvier relatif aux installations d'incinération de résidus
urbains), adopting similar emission standards and deadlines to the Directive. UK transposition
was achieved by the Municipal Waste Incineration Directions 1991, issued under the
Environmental Protection Act 1990: together, these required the authorisation of plants with a
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capacity greater than 1 t/hr, and that all such plants comply with ‘Best Available Technology
Not Entailing Excessive Costs’ (BATNEEC) guidance note standards, by the 1 December 1996.
These standards were stricter than the Directive with respect to both emission limits and range
of pollutants covered (see Table 1).
In terms of compliance with European and national emission standards three distinct paths are
apparent (cf. Table 2). In Germany almost all 48 ‘existing’ incinerators, and in the Netherlands
almost 50% of the existing incinerators (7 out of 13 plants were closed) were equipped with
abatement technology adequate to meet the national standards. Apart from a small number of
plants that needed a few extra months, all the German plants were retrofitted by the 1 December
1996 deadline set in the German ordinance. These plants emit less pollution than allowed by
either the EU Directive or the stricter German law. In the Netherlands abatement equipment was
retrofitted by 1 January 1995 as required by Dutch law, except in the case of one plant that was
granted an extension until 1 December 1996. Research undertaken for Waste Board of the
Dutch Ministry of the Environment, in 1995, found that almost all plants were within (and often
well below) the limits set by the Dutch regulation and none exceeded the EU Directive limits
(Hesseling et al, 1995).
In the UK, 33 out of the 37 existing municipal waste incinerators (MWIs) were closed, and the
waste largely transferred to landfill. One 1989 survey suggested that 12 of these plants would
have reached the end of their operating lives by 1994 in any case (House of Lord, Paper 17, p
52). The remaining 4 plants were upgraded to ensure compliance with both the Directive and
UK BATNEEC standards. At three of these upgrading was completed successfully – although
in one case waste throughput was reduced temporarily through the 1996 deadline whilst
upgrading was completed. However, work on the fourth plant suffered considerable delays, with
commissioning problems, breaches of emission limits and frequent shutdowns.
In France, the situation differs according to plant capacity.3 Before the Directive's
implementation, there existed approximately 250 ‘existing’ incinerators in France, about 62
with a capacity of above 6 t/hr, about 38 of a capacity between 3 and 6 t/hr and about 150 of a
capacity below 3 t/hr4. More than 50% (of the furnaces) of large plants, i.e. those with a capacity
greater than 6 t/hr, were only brought into compliance after the Directive’s 1996 deadline. With
compliance primarily achieved through technological upgrading, although some plants were
                                                          
3 With no comprehensive information available about actual emission levels, abatement equipment of
specific furnaces is taken as measure for compliance (cf. Schucht, 2000). For Germany and the
Netherlands annual average emission levels were available. For the UK, some emission data is available
as well as information on breaches.
4 This estimate is based on plant inventories of the ADEME (the environmental agency), the Ministry for
the Environment and TSM N° 9 (1994), cf. Schucht 2000.
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closed or replaced and a few reduced in size.5 All but one of France’s remaining large
incinerators were expected to comply by the end of 2000. Almost all of France’s small
incinerators are non- or late-compliant. In 1997 the majority (of furnaces) of incinerators with a
capacity between 3 and 6 t/hr did not comply6 with the Directive’s interim requirements for
1995. According to experts, the same holds true for plants with a capacity below 3 t/hr.
However, most waste is burnt in large incinerators, thus in compliant plants.
Table 2: Summary of countries’ compliance paths and implementation outcomes
France UK Germany Netherlands
Compliance strategy Partly late upgrading
or replacement of big
incinerators, sustained
non-compliance of
many small plants
Closure of majority of
incinerators and shift
to landfill
Retrofit of almost all
plants
Retrofit or closure of
plants
Average compliance
relative to EU Directive
Partly late or non-
compliance
Over-compliance Strong over-
compliance
Strong over-
compliance
Average compliance
relative to national law
Partly late or non-
compliance
Over-compliance Over-compliance Over-compliance
Source: Bültmann and Wätzold, 2000; Eames, 2000; Lulofs, 2000 and 2001; Schucht, 2000.
The question of what factors explain these differing national compliance paths is dealt with
below.
                                                          
5 Thus becoming subject to less strict environmental standards.
6 The most recent inventory of abatement equipment applied in waste incinerators that was available by
the time the article was prepared represented the situation in 1997.
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3. Germany
In the mid-1980s, the German public became highly concerned over emissions, particularly
dioxins, from waste incinerators. At that time more than 20% of Germany's municipal waste
was incinerated and this percentage was increasing. Citizens' groups and environmental
organisations pressed for tighter emission limits for existing incinerators and took legal action
against the authorisation and construction of new incinerators. Politicians and plant operators
were forced to take their concerns seriously. This public pressure not only led to stricter
emission limits it also helped bring about over-compliance with these limits.
Households Pay for Pollution Abatement
The German municipal waste sector is organised locally. District governments and independent
municipalities (Kreise und kreisfreie Städte) are responsible for both the collection and disposal
of municipal waste. They also decide whether it is landfilled, incinerated or composted.
Households are obliged to let the authorities take care of their waste and to pay waste collection
fees.
District governments/independent municipalities are either directly or indirectly7, depending
upon the state, subordinate to the state government but have comprehensive discretionary
powers.8 They consist of elected parliaments and (also elected) heads of administration.
Waste collection and disposal facilities de facto hold regional monopolies. They are either run
by district governments/independent municipalities or by private companies. In 1994 62% of
incinerators were privatised, usually as limited liability companies (cf. Kaimer/Schade, 1996).
Although district governments/independent municipalities often hold a majority interest, these
companies have a high degree of autonomy and public authorities can only interfere as ‘normal’
shareholders.  However, the competence to charge waste collection fees always remains with
the district government/independent municipalities. The fees the authorities charge equals their
costs, if they run waste disposal facilities themselves, or the payments they make to the private
companies.
The (predominately private) operators also have autonomy over their pollution abatement
decisions. Where abatement costs have increased operators have negotiated with district
                                                          
7 Via interposed regional governments (Bezirksregierungen).
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governments/independent municipalities to raise their payments accordingly. Given the public's
(i.e. voters and waste collection fee payers) concern over emissions, the authorities accepted
higher disposal charges to finance investment in pollution abatement. Ultimately, however, it is
private households that pay for abatement, as these costs are passed on in their waste collection
fees.
Monitoring and Enforcement by Independent Agencies
Once abatement equipment has been authorised and installed, supervisory authorities are in
charge of monitoring and enforcing compliance with emission limits. Under the German federal
structure, the States are responsible for establishing or appointing permitting and supervisory
authorities. Therefore, these authorities' position in the administrative hierarchy and their
dependency on elections can vary. However, in most States permitting authorities are part of the
general administration, i.e. district governments/independent municipalities or regional
governments, whilst monitoring and enforcement is performed by special environmental
agencies. These agencies are neither elected bodies nor an integral part of the general
administration; they therefore have a high degree of autonomy and direct decision-making
powers.
In Germany, the monitoring activities of the environmental agencies are supported by operators’
self-monitoring. With respect to most pollutants, MWI operators are required to install
continuous monitoring and recording equipment. The emission data are submitted to the
supervisory authority in a yearly emission report or by telemetric transfer. For other pollutants,
individual measurements are performed at least once a year. Operators are obliged to
commission (and pay) authorised institutes to carry out these measurements and forward the
results to the environmental agencies.
On the basis of the emission data provided by plant operators and authorised institutes,
environmental agencies control compliance with legal limits. The agencies appear to do their
job carefully. As they do not have to worry about elections or their standing in the
administrative hierarchy, they are interested only in ecological concerns. Furthermore, the
relatively small number of incinerators and the self-control mechanisms mean that monitoring
places few demands upon the environmental agencies’ resources. In cases of non-compliance
the agencies have a range of formal sanctions available – from fines to the permanent closure of
plants. Although the agencies generally try to resolve problems informally, there are examples
                                                                                                                                                           
8 The regional governments function as an extension of the state government. Their heads are appointed
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to show that they do apply severe sanctions when they think this necessary to obtain
compliance. However, German waste incineration plants rarely exceeded their emission limits,
and are normally well below those limits.
Technical Factors Contribute to Over-compliance
In addition to those factors mentioned above, two technical factors also contributed to the
incinerators' low emissions. Firstly, the refuse burnt in municipal waste incinerators is not
homogenous. Therefore plants must operate with a safety margin to ensure that peak emissions
do not exceed their limits. Secondly, the abatement technology introduced to control dioxin
emissions also further reduces emissions of many other pollutants. While the first factor holds
true for complying plants in all four countries, the second applies only to Germany and the
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent the UK which has a weaker national limit for dioxins (cf.
Table 1 above).
                                                                                                                                                           
by the state government and not accompanied by parliaments (cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 1996).
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4. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, air emissions from waste incineration were a public and political concern
long before the EU Directive was enacted. In 1979 the issue was dealt with by the Dutch
parliament. Six years later emission limits were imposed for a number of pollutants under the
1985 Incineration Guideline. However, the Guideline failed to lessen public concern over the
hazards of emissions from waste incinerators. On the contrary, public concern increased,
reaching a peak in 1989 when dioxins were found in dairy products produced from the milk of
cows grazed near to a waste incinerator. The dioxin contamination was so high that the milk and
dairy products were immediately removed from sale. As a result of this incident the Dutch
government hastened the introduction of stricter regulations to control emissions from waste
incinerators: issued as the 1989 Incineration Guideline (cf. Table 1). The first Dutch National
Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) published in 1989 clearly stated a preference for
incineration over (the also problematic alternative) landfill. Therefore in order to increase
incineration capacity, the Dutch government sought to make waste incineration more acceptable
through strict regulation.
Government Co-ordinates the Waste Markets
Dutch waste markets are co-ordinated by the public authorities. In principle, each Province
manages the collection and disposal of its waste, drawing up a waste plan estimating the amount
of waste and outlining the disposal methods to be used. The Province is the level in between the
central government and the municipalities. It is governed by a directly elected provincial
parliament (Provinciale Staten), a kind of a Provincial cabinet (Gedeputeerde Staten)9 and a
Commissar designated by the central cabinet. The Provinces' waste plans had to take into
account the central government's preference for waste incineration. This preference and the
resulting need for additional incineration capacity created an interest community between public
authorities (at national and provincial level) and plant operators.10 They all knew that the
construction of additional incinerators was only viable, if public acceptance of waste
incineration was enhanced.
The waste incinerators usually held regional monopolies and were run as limited liability
                                                          
9 The 'Gedeputeerde Staten' is a commission, which consists of six representatives of the 'Provinciale
Staten'. It takes care of the province's everyday business.
10 Waste incineration plant operators, co-ordinated by the sector association Veabrin (nowadays VVAV),
wanted to protect and expand their markets.
Implementation of Directive 89/429/EEC S. Schucht, A. Bültmann, M. Eames, K. Lulofs
Cerna 12
companies. The configuration of shareholders is different for every incinerator. However, in
most cases provincial or municipal public authorities hold majority shares. The plant
management autonomously takes day-to-day decisions, while a management board is
responsible for important decisions, e.g. about investments in expensive pollution abatement
equipment. Shareholders, and thus the public authorities, are represented on the management
board. Irrespective of the composition of its shareholders, the limited liability company is held
responsible for its environmental impacts and compliance with environmental regulations.
Both waste collection and disposal are financed through a waste tax raised by the municipalities.
Tax revenues are used to pay waste incinerators and other waste disposal plants and to cover the
municipalities’ waste collection costs. As regards the costs of installing abatement equipment,
plant operators negotiated higher payments from the authorities, financed through the waste tax.
Thus the abatement costs were passed on to local taxpayers.
A Multi-Layered Monitoring System
As a result of the 1989 Incineration Guideline and the transposition of the EU Directive, Dutch
permitting requirements had to be revised. In principal, the Provinces are responsible for
permitting as well as for monitoring and enforcement at municipal waste incinerators. The
provincial cabinet appoints non-elected civil servants to perform monitoring and enforcement.
However, when formal sanctions are required it is the provincial authorities that take the lead.
The work of the supervising civil servants is supported by self-controls of the incineration
plants. Plants must install monitoring equipment and computers that automatically record and
process emissions data on a number of substances. The remaining pollutants are measured
regularly. The plant's measuring system is part of the licensing procedure and is checked by
supervising civil servants when they inspect the plant. Inspections are performed frequently
(often every month) and include emission data, composition and storage of waste, functioning
of abatement technique etc.
The Inspectorate for Environmental Hygiene also plays a role in monitoring and enforcement.
The Inspectorate is part of the national Ministry of Housing, Land-use Planning and the
Environment and again consists of non-elected civil servants. It works towards provinces and
municipalities and only indirectly towards companies. For the provinces this implies that the
quality of their permits as well as the quality of their system of monitoring and enforcement is
controlled. The Inspectorate does not take enforcement action itself, but can force both the
provinces and municipalities to act. For instance a province can be instructed to renew or
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withdraw a permit, to impose a financial sanction etc.11 Finally, the Ministry of the
Environment’s Waste Board also participates in monitoring. It looks at the waste incineration
sector as a whole with respect to implementation of the national waste and air quality policy.
In 1995 the Waste Board announced the results of an inventory of the waste treatment sector: of
212 controls taken, 206 were within the limits set by the Dutch regulation, i.e. there were 6
breaches with Dutch regulation, but none exceeded the limits set by the European regulation
(Hesseling et al, 1995). Usually the emission values were much lower than even the strict Dutch
limits. The Provincial authorities knew about the breaches of the Dutch emission limits and
were working with the plants to solve the problems. There was one exception: the Dutch
authorities tolerated the failure of one existing waste incinerator to meet the new Dutch
regulations on 1 January 1995 and granted it an extension until 1 December 1996. Short term
breaches of emission limits are sometimes the cause of minor conflicts between the authorities
and the plant operators. However, these are resolved informally and to date formal sanctions
have not been employed against any municipal waste incinerators.
                                                          
11 The Dutch law (Provinciewet) that deals with the competencies of the provinces, defines
environmental policy as a joined responsibility of the national and the provincial level. This means that
the provinces do not have the discretionary power not to perform permitting, controlling and enforcement
tasks. If necessary, the national cabinet can order the Commissar to deal with the issue.
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5. France
Until the mid-1990s there was little public awareness of the environmental and health problems
associated with (dioxin) emissions from waste incinerators in France. Indeed, incineration was
generally considered to be ‘clean’, while landfill was regarded as rather problematic. This
assessment of waste treatment alternatives was mirrored in the 1992 French waste law, which
sought ambitious reductions in the landfilling of waste by essentially banning the landfilling of
municipal waste from 2002, and compensating for this with material and energy recycling (the
latter referring to incineration with energy recovery) (MarketLine, 1994). Only after Greenpeace
launched a campaign in 1996, and cows milk heavily contaminated with dioxins was found in
the neighbourhood of a waste incinerator in 1998, has dioxin pollution become a public
concern. Consequently, the public estimation of waste incineration has deteriorated, putting the
French Ministry of the Environment in a stronger position to finally implement the ministerial
order of 1991, by which the EU Directive was transposed into French law. A development
facilitated by the replacement of a weak Environment Minister, with a politically stronger
minister, in 1997.
Mayors Take Final Decision on Pollution Abatement
In France, municipalities (collectivités locales), i.e. the smallest administrative units, have the
responsibility for municipal waste collection and treatment. They consist of a mayor and a
parliamentary assembly whose members are directly elected at the local level. How municipal
waste is treated is stipulated in waste management plans set at the regional level (départements)
in cooperation with the municipalities. In 1998 35% of the French municipal waste was
incinerated (www.ademe.fr/collectivites/Dechets/chiffres/dec01.htm, 23/11/2000). As even
small municipalities often have their own incinerator, France has a high number of existing
incineration plants (approximately 250 before the final implementation of the Directive), many
of which are very small.  12 However, the majority of incineration takes place at very large plants
around the big cities. Waste collection, treatment and related investments are financed by local
taxes (AMORCE, 1999). Therefore to finance investment in abatement equipment taxes have to
be increased.
French municipal waste incinerators are local monopolies and are generally owned by the
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municipalities. However, there are various ways of organising their construction and
management (AMORCE, 1999): the municipality is responsible for construction and a) operates
the plant itself or b) delegates the operation to a private firm; alternatively, the municipality
delegates both construction and operation to a private firm. Independent of the organisation of
their construction and operation, the incinerators are financed by the municipalities (via taxes)
and at the end of the contract fall back into municipal ownership. According to French law,
whoever applied for authorisation – be it a private company or the municipality – is liable for
environmental impacts of the plant. However, as the municipality indirectly pays for all
investment, it remains responsible for the final decision concerning the installation of abatement
equipment.
The mayor, as head of the local government, is therefore the key actor with respect to abatement
decisions. As a locally elected political actor, the mayor can be assumed to not only follow the
‘public’ but also their private interest, i.e. the wish to be re-elected. When taking compliance
decisions the mayor therefore considers the voters' preferences for reduced emissions on the one
hand against lower taxes on the other. The mayors' decision will therefore depend on variables
such as local fiscal pressure and the voters’ willingness to pay for environmental measures.
Non-Specialised Enforcement Authorities
According to the ”law on classified installations” of 1976, waste incineration plants have to
apply for an operation permit with the DRIRE13 (Direction Régionale de l’Industrie, de la
Recherche et de l’Environnement) and with the prefect (préfets). As the local permitting and
enforcement body, the DRIRE act as the representative of and are supervised by the Ministries
of Industry, Research and the Environment. The prefect is the central government's
representative at the local level. Neither the DRIRE nor the prefects are therefore specialist
environmental bodies.14
Where new legal emission limits are formulated, the DRIRE/prefect is responsible for
incorporating them into the plants' operation permits as well as for monitoring and enforcing the
plants' compliance. Incinerators subject to continuous measuring requirements need to self-
monitor their emissions and transfer the results to the DRIRE. Additionally, recognised
                                                                                                                                                           
12 A 1993 plant inventory including all plants with a capacity above 3 t/hr showed that these plants
represented only about 1/3 of all French municipal waste incineration plants which however treated about
92% of total waste incinerated (TSM N° 9, 1994).
13 Some smaller plants, however, are authorised by the DDAF (department of agriculture and forestry) or
by the DDASS (department of sanitary and social activity) at the level of a ‘département’.
14 Owing to this, in the following, we consider the DRIRE and the prefect as if they were one actor.
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technical measuring organisations come to measure emissions manually. While large
incinerators measure their emissions regularly, a study set up by the French Environmental
Ministry in 1999 showed that not all small plants fulfil their measurement requirements. As
previously described in section 2, large numbers of small plants (capacity below 6t/hr) fail to
comply with their emission limits. Most of the large incinerators are in compliance, but many
only achieved compliance after the 1996 deadline set in the EU Directive.
Enforcement measures towards non-complying plants in France cover two steps. In the first
step, called “mise en demeure”, the prefect fixes a date by which the plant must comply with its
operating permit. If this date is exceeded, the plant is either closed or production suspended or
the second step of the enforcement procedure is applied. In this second step, called “procédure
de consignation”, the operator has to pay the monies necessary to bring the plant into
compliance into the public treasury. When compliance is achieved or the plant closed, the
money is repaid to the operator. Until 1998 the DRIRE/prefect took hardly any enforcement
measures. As bodies not specialised on environmental issues they balanced different policy
interests and frequently decided in favour of industry or cost savings. Implementation of the
Directive was not always their priority. Additionally, some mayors were reported to have put
pressure on the DRIRE/prefect not to take action against non-compliant incinerators. Given the
French public's low level of awareness of the risks associated with emissions from waste
incineration, the mayors thought their chance of being re-elected to be higher if they kept taxes
low (and hence emissions high).15
In 1998, after the Greenpeace campaign and the dioxin milk contamination ‘woke up’ the
French public, the Environmental Ministry finally instructed the prefects to apply enforcement
measures. This has been successful at least with respect to non-compliant large incinerators.
With respect to small incinerators the lax policy continues. Formal sanctions (the second stricter
enforcement step) were not employed until the end of 1999. Apparently, not even the
measurement requirements defined by the Directive have been enforced, particularly in the case
of plants with a capacity below 3 t/hr.
High Costs and Uncertainty Additionally Explain Poor Compliance Results
In addition to the absence of enforcement and the low awareness of the French public, two other
explanatory factors can be identified. Firstly due to economies of scale, retrofitting with
abatement equipment is disproportionately expensive for small plants. As small municipalities
often do not have the financial means to bear these costs (without considerable tax increases)
                                                          
15 France held municipal elections in 1995.
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and the cheaper waste treatment alternative of landfilling was not available, they aimed to delay
compliance as long as possible. Indeed there is some evidence to suggest that it may be
attempted to keep non-compliant small plants running, supposedly until the end of their
operational lives. Secondly, uncertainty related to waste policy has been one of the decisive
factors explaining late compliance at least of the large French incinerators. To comply with the
EU Directive, plant owners, i.e. municipalities, could choose between closing down their plants
and retrofitting them with expensive abatement equipment. During the decision-making process,
a number of new regulations were also being prepared. In 1992, a new French waste law was
issued which changed the hierarchy of waste treatment options. In 1993/1994 discussions about
a new EU Waste Incineration Directive with revised emission limits began, and in 1998 the
French Environmental Minister demanded a revision of the regional waste plans in order to
reduce the share of waste incineration relative to material recycling. The resulting uncertainty
slowed down compliance decisions.
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6. The United Kingdom
Unlike many mainland European countries, municipal waste incineration historically played a
relative minor role in the UK. With only around 7 to 10% of the total waste arising burnt in
incinerators in the early 1990s (Loader et al., 1991). Dioxins have been an issue of concern for
environmental and public health policy-makers in the UK since at least the mid-1980s.
Nevertheless, the UK government has consistently taken a more relaxed view of the risks
associated with dioxins than the Dutch and German governments. The UK’s ‘first past the post’
electoral system has meant the Green Party has achieved little representation at either local or
national levels. However, over the last decade environmental NGOs and ‘grass roots’ citizens’
organisations campaigning against waste incinerators have attracted increasing public support
and political influence. The hazards associated with dioxin emissions from incinerators now
feature as a prominent public concern (Murray, 1999).
Local Authority Discretion Curtailed
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s waste policy was poorly articulated and implemented in the
UK. Under the Control of Pollution Act 1974 the management and disposal of municipal waste
was the responsibility of the local Waste Disposal Authority: usually the Metropolitan or
County Council. The Waste Disposal Authority was free to choose the most economical
disposal option available. The Department of the Environment restricted its role to the provision
of information to Waste Disposal Authorities on different disposal options (House of Lords,
1989).
The UK’s existing municipal waste incinerators were predominantly located in urban areas
where there was a single layer of local government: a Metropolitan Council comprising locally
elected members. These Metropolitan Councils were not only responsible for the collection and
disposal of municipal waste, they also owned and operated the waste incinerators.16 Waste
management (incl. pollution abatement at incinerators) was financed from the Council's general
budget, made up of a combination of local taxation and an annual block grant from the central
government, administered by the Department of the Environment, which was responsible for
                                                          
16 More recently, a number of forms of public-private-sector partnership arrangements have been
adopted (i.e. joint ventures, contracting-out of services to private firms, and the Private Finance Initiative)
bringing private-sector capital and expertise into the UK waste sector, and financing the development of a
number of new large waste-to-energy plants.
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authority local finance.17 Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s the Department of the
Environment maintained tight control over local government expenditure, in line with Treasury
policy to reduce the UK’s public sector borrowing requirement. Councils had limited discretion
over local taxation and were effectively required to set budgets within limits specified by central
government. Moreover, the Department of the Environment refused to subsidise the up-grading
costs associated with the EU Directive.
Weak Position of Local Authority Plant Operators Vis-à-Vis Central Government
Prior to 1989 UK municipal waste incinerators were not subject to any prior authorisation,
detailed emissions limits or monitoring. The relevant local authority, usually the Metropolitan
Council (i.e. the plant owner/operator) was responsible for pollution control under the Clean Air
Acts of 1956 and 1968. However, this was limited to the regulation of chimney height, dust
abatement equipment and the emission of dark smoke (House of Lords, 1989).
Responsibility for negotiation and subsequent implementation of the EU Directive rested with
the Department of the Environment.18 In 1987 Her Majesties Inspectorate of Pollution (the
Inspectorate) was established, as a Directorate of the Department, to provide an integrated
national pollution regulator.19 The Inspectorate comprised professional civil servants and was
not subject to local political control. In 1989 the Inspectorate assumed responsibility for the
regulation (i.e. prior authorisation, monitoring and enforcement) of all incinerators with a
capacity greater than 1 t/hr.20 As a result regulatory responsibility was not only significantly
tightened, but also passed from local authorities to a centralised national pollution regulator. It
was therefore the Inspectorate that undertook the practical implementation of the Directive. The
final legislative framework for which was provided by the Environmental Protection Act 1990
as noted above.
Having lost regulatory responsibility for incineration processes, Councils operating incinerators
were in a weak position to resist implementation of the Directive. They had little influence over
the pollution Inspectorate, which required them to apply for authorisations for their plants by
December 1992 (ENDS Report, 208, 1992). These authorisations, not only set out detailed
monitoring and reporting requirements, they also required that plants be upgraded to BATNEEC
standards by December 1996 or closed. Failure to comply with these requirements would have
                                                          
17 The structure and financing of local government in the UK is complex, and has undergone a number of
far reaching revisions over the last twenty-five years.
18 Which in 1997 merged with the Department of Transport to form the Department for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions.
19 HMIP was subsumed within Environment Agency with its establishment as a fully independent
Agency on the 1 April 1996.
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made them liable to formal legal sanctions under the 1990 Act.
UK plant operators are required to monitor their emissions – through continuous or regular
measurements – and to report any breaches of their authorisation to the regulator. Almost 500
breaches of emissions limits were reported at incinerators (including municipal waste,
hazardous waste and sewage sludge incinerators) between January 1996 and November 1998
(HC Written Answers, 9 November 1998). The majority of these breaches are thought to have
occurred at MWI plants. Most relate to very short hydrogen chloride (HCl) ‘spikes’ of a few
seconds or minutes duration. In the main caused by the incineration of large amounts of plastics
generating large volumes of acid gas and temporarily overcoming the abatement equipment
(ENDS, 1999a). Such breaches have occurred at both ‘new’ and ‘existing’ plants. The
Environment Agency (the Inspectorate’s successor) has used both informal (negotiation) and
formal sanctions (enforcement notices and prosecutions) to solve these problems: requiring
plant operators to ensure better mixing of the refuse burnt, and undertake improvements to the
acid gas abatement equipment (Eames, 2000).
Low-Cost Landfill and Constraints on Local Authority Expenditure Explain Closures
As the Department of the Environment refused to subsidise incinerators‘ upgrading costs and at
the same time placed tight constraints on local authority expenditure and taxation, only a few
Councils could afford the investment required to upgrade their plants. The relative abundance
and low cost of landfill, coupled in the early 1990s with the absence of national policy to
promote more sustainable alternatives, therefore meant that all but four of the UK’s existing
incinerators were closed. Only those plants equipped with energy recovery were upgraded and
continued in operation. Largely because of the opportunity to sell electricity on long-term
contracts at premium prices to electricity supply companies under the Non-Fossil Fuel
Obligation (NFFO), introduced under the Electricity Act 1989 to support renewable energy and
subsidise nuclear power.
Out of the remaining plants three were upgraded successfully. However, the fourth suffered
significant delays and commissioning problems, and in December 1999 was prosecuted and
fined close to the maximum available under UK law (ENDS, 1999b).
                                                                                                                                                           
20 Under the Health and Safety (Emissions into the Atmosphere) (Amendment) Regulations 1989.
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7. Conclusions
The aim of this article was to identify the key factors influencing the implementation of the
1989 Municipal Waste Incineration Directive that explain the three distinct compliance paths of
the countries studied: Over-compliance through retrofitting or replacement of plants in Germany
and the Netherlands, compliance through the closure of the majority of plants in the UK and late
or non-compliance in France. The driving factors obtained from the previous chapters are
summarised in Table 3 below.
Classical implementation variables: At first sight the classical implementation variables, i.e.
monitoring and enforcement, are generally in line with overall compliance outcomes observed.
However, it is clear that a number of other factors have significantly influenced the
implementation outcomes observed (see below). Furthermore, whilst these ‘classical’ variables
may explain compliance, they are not usually taken to explain over-compliance. Instead, we
identified a number of technical and political factors as contributing to the pattern of over-
compliance found. These include, the need for a safety margin to cope with peak emissions and
the fact that the abatement technology introduced to control dioxins also further reduces the
emissions of some other pollutants.
Non-classical implementation variables: independent specialist institutions seem to further
successful implementation, i.e. strict enforcement. In Germany, the Netherlands and the UK
specialist environmental bodies were responsible for (or oversaw) monitoring and enforcement.
Unconstrained by broader political concerns these bodies could use their autonomy to favour the
environment, i.e. to require compliance. In France, on the other hand, delayed or non-
compliance was made possible by non-specialised local regulators and enforcers, trading off
environmental versus economic issues.
The involvement of local governments in waste disposal introduces the potential for conflicts of
interest where the local authorities own disposal facilities. However, in practice this has only led
to implementation difficulties in France. Where the mayors, as both head of the local
government and owner of incineration plants, were frequently able to exert pressure on the
prefects to delay enforcement. In the other three countries this was not possible because the
regulatory bodies were generally independent of political pressure.
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Table 3: Factors explaining compliance results
France Germany The Netherlands UK
'Classical' implementation variables
Monitoring Systematic monitoring at
large plants. Limited
monitoring at small
plants
Systematic monitoring and
some automatic
transmission of data
Systematic monitoring
and some automatic
transmission of data
Systematic monitoring
Enforcement Late enforcement at big
plants. Enforcement at
small plants still delayed
Formal and informal
sanctions employed – but
rarely needed
Formal sanction
available but not used –
informal solutions
preferred
Formal and informal
sanctions employed
'Non-classical' implementation variables
Position of
monitoring and
enforcement authorities
Representative of central
government at regional
level
Not specialised on
environmental issues
Not elected
Agencies that are not an
integral part of the
administration
Specialised on
environmental issues
Not elected
Civil servants appointed
by regional governments
Specialised on
environmental issues
Not elected
Initially part of the
central Ministry of the
Environment. From
1996 an independent
agency
Specialised on
environmental issues
Not elected
Power relationship
between plant
owners / operators and
monitoring and
enforcement authorities
Public plant owners
exert political influence
over pollution regulator
Pollution regulator in
dominant position
Interest community Pollution regulator in
dominant position
Other explanatory variables
Awareness of
environmental and health
risks from incineration
(especially dioxins)
Previously low,
increasing since mid-
1990s
High since mid-1980s High since mid-1980s Medium - increasing
since mid-1980s
Decision-making power in
plants
Local governments as
owners decide on
investments
District governments /
municipalities interfere as
share holders
Provincial / municipal
governments interfere
as share holders
Municipal governments
as owners and
operators
Financing of pollution
abatement
Local taxes Fees collected by district
governments and
municipalities
Fees collected by
municipal governments
Local taxes and block
grant from central
government
Ability to pass on
pollution abatement costs
Limited by low public
willingness to pay
Facilitated by local waste
monopoly and high public
willingness to pay
Facilitated by local
waste monopoly and
high public willingness
to pay
Limited by central
constraints on local
government expenditure
Alternative option of
landfill available
No Incineration is prioritised Incineration is prioritised Yes
Policy interactions 1992 waste law; policy
uncertainty
Stricter national waste
incineration law (including
0.1 ng/nm3 dioxin limit)
Stricter national waste
incineration law
(including 0.1 ng/nm3
dioxin limit)
Tight budget policy;
renewable energy policy
(NFFO); stricter national
waste incineration law
(including 1
ng/nm3dioxin limit)
Other explanatory variables: public and political awareness; industrial structure; interactions
with both national environmental and non-environmental policies; and, regulatory uncertainty
and anticipation, all played an important role - both negative and positive - in the outcomes
observed.
In Germany and the Netherlands the implementation of stricter domestic legislation was clearly
driven by the high degree of public and political awareness of the environmental and health
impacts of incineration, particularly those associated with dioxins. Furthermore, the
combination of monopolies funded through local taxation and high public awareness (which one
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can assume to be positively correlated with individual households willing to pay for abatement
measures) encouraged German and Dutch plant operators to reduce their emissions below their
legal limits as it made it relatively straightforward for them to pass on their abatement costs.
This argument is also consistent with the pattern of late or absent enforcement found in France.
Where low public and political awareness of environmental and health hazards, was correlated
with the absence of stricter domestic emissions legislation and an assumed low willingness to
pay increased waste taxes for abatement measures, and where only after public and political
awareness rose were enforcement measures were taken.
Policy interactions explain the strikingly different (non-)compliance paths taken by France and
the UK - the two ‘laggard’ countries where plants faced significant upgrading costs to meet the
Directive standards. In the UK the absence, until recently, of a coherent national waste policy
contributed to the availability of landfill as an alternative to incineration, whilst policy to
promote renewable energy (i.e. the NFFO) facilitated the upgrading of those plants with energy
recovery. In France interactions with the national (1992) waste law closed off landfill as an
alternative for domestic waste, whilst promoting incineration with energy recovery (in both
Germany and the Netherlands a policy presumption against landfill also favoured investment in
the incineration sector). Hence in the UK, unlike in France, it was possible to reduce compliance
costs by choosing to transfer waste from incineration to landfill, as the least costs waste
treatment option. Indeed, the availability of an alternative low-cost waste treatment option can
be assumed to be the major driver behind the UK's particular compliance path. Finally, in the
French case compliance was disproportionately expensive for the large number of small plants
(due to economies of scale in abatement), whilst regulatory anticipation and uncertainty
contributed to the pattern of late or delayed compliance for large incinerators.
Lessons for European environmental policy: The case studies and analysis presented above
suggest the following policy lessons. Firstly, high public and political awareness of
environmental and health hazards facilitates implementation. Where necessary, measures to
promote information concerning such hazards should therefore accompany or form part of
future policies. Secondly, this research highlights the need for policy makers to pay attention to
the possibility of both positive and negative policy interactions. With respect to parallel
environmental measures at least, this suggests a need for better policy integration. Finally,
politically independent specialist regulatory (monitoring and enforcement) authorities may be
preferable to non-specialist institutions and institutions subject to political influence for the
implementation of environmental policy.
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